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Additionally, the court invoked CPLR 3026 which grants pleadings
a liberal construction absent prejudice to a party's substantial right
1 12
and concluded that the plaintiff here suffered no such detriment.
It was determined that preclusion of the State from possible prosecution of defendant for perjury by permitting the service of an unverified pleading should not serve as a basis for a claim of prejudice. 113
McMahon seems to have further illustrated that the CPLR is not
to be regarded as a plethora of mere technicalites to be raised throughout various stages of the proceedings for the sole purpose of delay. CPLR
3026 is designed to streamline the mechanism of a civil lawsuit, not
encumber it. Absent prejudice to a substantial right of a party, defects
in pleadings must be ignored. 114 The McMahon court, in concluding
that a liberal construction of the pleadings was warranted because
precluding the plaintiff from subsequently prosecuting defendant for
perjury did not constitute substantial prejudice, appears to have made
a wise determination in not requiring verification of defendant's answer, especially since the issues had been adequately framed for trial.
31 - DiscLostuE
CPLR 3101(a)(4): Court of Appeals applies a strict interpretationto
"special circumstances" requirement for obtaining disclosure from
nonparty witness.
ARnrci

Full disclosure of material and necessary evidence may be obtained
from a nonparty witness under CPLR 3101(a)(4), provided "adequate
special circumstances" are shown by the litigant seeking such disclosure.115 Although the statute does not specify what may constitute ade112 Id. at 389-90, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 936. See Kreiling v. Jayne Estates, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d
895, 897, 274 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1966) wherein the court, pursuant
to CPLR 3026, ignored defendant's allegedly defective verification on the ground that
plaintiff had! shown no prejudice to a substantial right. See also 3 WK&M J 3022.04, at
30-523 to -524 ("Irregularities in the verification will rarely result in prejudice to a party
or affect the substance of the litigation.').
113 78 Misc. 2d at 389-90, 356 N.Y.S.2d 936. See also 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 3022, commentary at 399-400 (1974) (prospect of perjury coming out of a civil
pleading is remote).
114 CPLR 3026; Capital Newspapers Div. -The
Hearst Corp. v. Vanderbilt, 44 Misc.
3022.04.
2d 542, 543-44, 254 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311-12 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964); 3 WK&M
115 CPLR 3101(a) provides in pertinent part that:
There shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof, by:

(4) any person where the court on motion determines that there are adequate special circumstances.
With respect to the remainder of.CPLR 3101(a), paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to disclosure
by parties to an action and assignors of an action, respectively. Disclosure by a person who
is about to leave the state, resides outside the state, resides more than 100 miles from
the place of trial, or is so ill as to reasonably suggest that he will be unable to attend
the trial may be obtained under paragraph (3).
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quate special circumstances, both appellate and trial courts agree that
special circumstances exist where a party seeks to examine an uncooper1 17
ative or hostile witness." 6 In Allen v. Crowell-CollierPublishing Co.,
the Court of Appeals recommended that CPLR 3101(a) be given a
liberal interpretation so as to permit disclosure whenever it is reasonable and useful to pending litigation." 8 Although Allen dealt with
It should be noted that although CPLR 3101(a)(4) dearly contemplates the use of a
motion, there is authority to the effect that disclosure under the statute may proceed by
way of notice. See Muss v. Utilities & Indus. Corp., 61 Misc. 2d 642, 05 N.Y.S.2d 540
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969) (mem.) (under CPLR, disclosure in first instance is anticipated to be by stipulation or notice); Bush Homes, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 61 Misc. 2d
495, 305 N.YS.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969) (mem.) (CPLR 3101(a)(4) does not
set forth the procedure for obtaining disclosure; it only establishes the scope of disclosure).
See also Spector v. Antenna & Radome Research Associates Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 569, 267
N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1966) (mem.) (purpose of CPLR art. 31 is to permit maximum
disclosure with a minimum of judicial supervision). Assuming it is permissible to proceed
on notice under CPLE. 3101(a)(4), the party seeking disclosure would serve a subpoena
upon the witness in accordance with CPLR 3106(b) and, if an oral examination is sought,
such party would also, pursuant to CPLR 3107, serve a notice of the examination upon his
adversary. If examination of documents in the possession of a nonparty is sought, notice
to all adverse parties would apparently be required. CPLR 3120(b).
In addition, it has been suggested that the motion requirement embodied in CPLR
3101(a)(4) can also be dispensed with if all persons concerned with the disclosure proceeding stipulate to the examination of the nonparty witness. See H. PEraRmUND & J.
MCLAUGRIIN, NEv YouR PRAcrcE 1028 n.4 (3d ed. 1973).

'16Among other grounds, CPA 288, the predecessor of CPLR 3101, permitted the
examination of a nonparty witness if "special circumstances render it proper." This provision was held to authorize the examination of witnesses who were available for trial but
likely to be hostile to the party seeking the examination. See, e.g., Ortner v. Bankers Sec.
Life Ins. Soc'y, 17 App. Div. 2d 325, 235 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Ist Dep't 1962); Harrington v. Albany,
8 App. Div. 2d 545, 183 N.Y.S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1959) (mem.). Courts have taken the same
approach under CPLR 3101(a)(4). See, e.g., O'Riordan v. Northern Westchester Hosp., 19
App. Div. 2d 899, 244 N.YS.2d 880 (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.); Flanigen v. Mullen & Gunn,
Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 944, 258 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965). See generally 7B
McKrNNEm's CPLR 3101, commentary at 25 (1970).
Examination of a nonparty witness under CPA 288 was also permitted where that
person was found to have special or exclusive knowledge of the facts in issue. See Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding, 2 App. Div. 2d 430, 156 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1956). This
rule continues under CPLR 3101(a)(4). See McDonald v. Gore Mt. Ski Lift Corp., 30 App.
Div. 2d 931, 293 N.Y.S.2d 553 (3d Dep't 1968) (mere.).
117 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 43 ST.JOHN's L. REv. 302, 324 (1968).
11"21 N.Y.2d at 406-07, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452. The defendant in Allen
maintained that the legislature intended "to permit disclosure only of evidence directly
related to issues raised by the pleadings ... ' Id. at 408, 235 N.E.2d at 433, 288 N.Y.S.2d
at 453. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated that a liberal view with respect to
pretrial disclosure had even been adopted under CPA 288 since it was believed that such
an approach would assist trial preparation. Id. at 407, 235 N.E2.d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at
452, citing Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding, 2 App. Div. 2d 430, 156 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1st Dep't 1956); Cornell v. Eaton, 286 App. Div. 1124, 146 N.Y.S.2d 449 (3d Dep't 1955)
(per curiam); Dorms, Inc. v. Dorros Bros., 274 App. Div. 11, 80 N.Y.S.2d 25 (lst Dep't
1948).
Although not mentioned by Allen, it should be noted that the draftsmen of CPLR
3101 stated that the scope of disclosure afforded under CPA 288 should be continued
under CPLR 3101. SmTH Re. at 43. This statement, taken in conjunction with the
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disclosure between parties to an action,11 9 the expansive language used
by the Court in describing the scope of CPLR 3101(a)120 suggested to
some that the term adequate special circumstances also be construed in
a liberal fashion. 12 '
Arguing that the "general tenor [of the Allen decision] makes it
almost irrelevant that 3101(a)(4) was not directly involved," one practice commentator has urged that disclosure against a nonparty witness
in New York be just as permissive as it is in federal practice. 22 Indeed,
post-Allen decisions at both the appellate division and trial levels reflect an increasing willingness on the part of the courts to view the
special circumstances requirement liberally in ordering disclosure by
a nonparty witness.' 23 Perhaps the most sweeping application of the
Allen reasoning is found in Kenford v. County of Erie,124 where the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, adopted the liberal construction suggested by Professor David D. Siegel: "A mere showing by the
lawyer that he needs such witness's pretrial deposition in order to
increasingly liberal interpretation given CPA 288 by the courts, leads to the conclusion that
the legislature, in enacting CPLR,3101, intended to create a liberal disclosure device.
119 Plaintiffs in Allen, pursuant to CPLR 3101(a)(1), sought answers to certain interrogatories. 21 N.Y.2d at 405, 285 N.E.2d at 431, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
120 Writing for the Allen Court, Chief Judge Fuld stated that:
The words, "material and necessary", are, in our view, to be interpreted liberally
to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which
will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and
prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason. CPLR 3101 (subd. [a]) should
be construed ... to permit discovery of testimony "which is sufficiently related
to the issues in litigation to make the effort to obtain it in preparation for trial
reasonable"....
Id. at 406-07, 285 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452, quoting SA WK&M J 3101.07, at
31-24.
121 See 3A WK&M
3101.32. As Professor David D. Siegel has observed:
A rigid construction of paragraph (4) will surely detour the clear direction set by
the Allen decision. It seems to this writer that an implementation of the tenor
of the Allen decision demands a very liberal construction of paragraph (4).
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary at 26 (1970).
122 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary at 27 (1970).
123 See, e.g., Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 41 App. Div. 2d 586, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300
(4th Dep't 1973) (mem.); Nussdorf v. Howell, 79 Misc. 2d 801, 361 N.Y.SU.d 122 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1974) (mem.); Gates v. State, 72 Misc. 2d 844, 339 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Ct. Cl.

1972).

It should be noted that many decisions under CPLR 3101(a)(4) involve the application
of the hostile witness rule. See note 116 supra. Such cases are often resolved without any
reliance upon the Allen decision. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Eli Lilly &cCo., 36 App. Div. 2d 533,
318 N.Y.S.2d 636 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.) (in a wrongful death action examination of
decedents parents permitted where neither would speak except under compulsion of
subpoena); McDonald v. Gore Mt. Ski Lift Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 931, 293 N.Y.S.2d 553,
554 (3d Dep't 1968) (mem.) (special circumstances exist "when it is established that the
witness is hostile, or where the witness has special or exclusive knowledge of the facts in
issue.').
12441 App. Div. 2d 586, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300 (4th Dep't 1973) (mem.).
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prepare fully for the trial should suffice as a 'special circumstance.' ",125
Notwithstanding Kenford, the Court of Appeals, in Cirale v. 80 Pine
Street Corp.,128 refused to apply the liberal policy enunciated in Allen
to CPLR 3101(a)(4).
In Cirale, a steampipe in a building located in New York City
exploded, causing the death of plaintiff's intestate. A board of inquiry
was convened by the City's Commissioner of Buildings to investigate
the accident. 127 Following the commencement of the instant wrongful
death action, both plaintiff and defendants moved separately to obtain
the records of the board relating to the accident. 28 Since the City was
not a party to the action, all movants proceeded under CPLR 3101(a)(4).
It is unclear whether the parties made any independent effort to obtain
information concerning the explosion prior to their respective motions;
they merely alleged that "since [the Board's] investigation was the only
one taken .

. . ,

its results and contents [were] material and necessary

to the proof of [their] case."'1 9 The Supreme Court, New York County,
concluding that "the Board of Inquiry has special and exclusive knowledge of the events surrounding the explosion," agreed and therefore
granted the motion for disclosure. 180 The Appellate Division, First
Department, affirmed the court's order.113
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the special circumstances requirement in paragraph (4) imposed limitations on the otherwise sweeping language of CPLR 3101(a). 13 2 Without mentioning
Allen, Judge Jasen, speaking for the majority, stated that an assertion
by a movant that the information sought was "material and necessary"
1251d., 340 N.Y.S.2d at 302, quoting 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 8101, commentary at 27

(1970).

126 35 N.Y.2d 113, 816 N.E.2d 801, 859 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1974), rev'g 41 App. Div. 2d 1030,
344 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Ist Dep't 1973) (mem.).
127 The board had three responsibilities: (1) to determine the facts surrounding the

explosion; (2) to ascertain if there was any violation of the building code or relevant
regulations; and, (3)to study the causes of the accident in order to develop remedial
legislation. 35 N.Y.2d at 115, 816 N.E2.d at 302, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 2-8.
128 Plaintiff motioned for discovery and inspection of the following: (1) the names and

addresses of witnesses called by the board whose testimony related to the explosion; (2)
statements concerning the explosion made by witnesses appearing before the board; (8)
documents, reports, records, and papers which the board had access to and which related
to the explosion; and, (4) the contents of the board's report. Defendants filed a crossmotion for the same purpose. Id. at 115-16, 316 NXE.2d at 802, 359 N.YS.2d at 3.
129 Id. at 116, 316 N.E.2d at 803, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 4 (emphasis in original).
130 Id. at 116, 316 N.E.2d at 802, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 3.See also note 116 supra.
13141 App. Div. 2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Ist Dep't 1973) (mem.). Appeal was taken
to the Court of Appeals by the City of New York on a certified question of law. 85 N.Y.2d
at 116, 316 N.E.2d at 302, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
132 35 N.Y.2d at 116, 316 N.E.2d at 302, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
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could not be considered a special circumstance. 133 Nor, the Court observed, is it sufficient to merely allege in a motion under CPLR 3101
(a)(4) that special circumstances exist: any such claim must be accompanied by specific support. 3 4 Accordingly, in the instant case, the
Court would require that the movant demonstrate that he had conducted an independent investigation of the explosion. In passing on a
3101(a)(4) motion, a trial court then might consider plaintiff's inability
to obtain, through his own devices, sufficient evidence to establish a
cause of action against defendants, a "circumstance" warranting an
order granting disclosure. 35
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gabrielli stated that there was
"no particular authority for the majority's insistence that respondents
show their inability otherwise to obtain the sought after information."' 86 Conceding that such a rule might be applicable if the information sought had been gathered through the efforts of another party
to the action, 3 7 the Judge emphasized that in this case, the public
agency investigating the explosion was not a party and was unlikely
to be made one. Given the seriousness of the explosion and the duplication inherent in an investigation carried out by any of the movants,
the dissent concluded that the special circumstances test had indeed
38
been met.
In refusing to apply to CPLR 3101(a)(4) the liberal reasoning it
133 Id. at 116-17, 316 NYE.2d at 303, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
134 Id. at 117, 316 NE.2d at 303, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
135 Id. at 116, 316 N.E.2d at 302-03, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 3-4. The majority did not, however,
state that in the instant case the mere inability of plaintiff to obtain such evidence would
automatically satisfy the "special circumstances" test. See id.
In addition to the question of whether movants had met the "special circumstances"
requirement of CPLR 3101(a)(4), the Court of Appeals also considered a second issue, viz,
whether the City's common law privilege of confidentiality with respect to communications
made to its employees in the course of their official duties would bar disclosure of the
board's records. Although the Court did not answer the question, it did say that the
City could raise the issue if movants sought further discovery proceedings. Id. at 119, 316
N.E.2d at 304, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 6. In his dissent, Judge Gabrielli argued that since the
trial court had specifically rejected such a claim of confidentiality and the City did not
directly challenge that ruling on appeal, it was inappropriate for the Court to consider
the issue. Id. at 120, 316 NE.2d at 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (Gabrielli & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
'a6Id. at 119, 316 N.E2d at 304, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (Gabrielli & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
137Id., citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, plaintiffs sought
to compel defendant's attorney to produce all statements he had taken from third parties
who had witnessed an accident involving plaintiffs' decedent. The Supreme Court refused
to grant plaintiff's motion for disclosure, holding that a party seeking such disclosure must
himself examine the nonparty witness before he can compel disclosure of information
possessed by such witness from another party. Id. at 509.
138 35 N.Y.2d at 120, 316 N.E.2d at 304-05, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (Gabrielli SeStevens, JJ.,
dissenting). Notably, the dissent did not rely upon the Allen decision in reaching this
conclusion.
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had enunciated in Allen, 1 9 the Court of Appeals has embarked upon
a highly questionable course. The Court has indeed imposed a heavy
burden on litigants by requiring that they conduct an independent
investigation in an attempt to discover evidence already possessed by
a nonparty. This investigation very often may amount to nothing more
than an unnecessary, costly, and time-consuming duplication of a completed investigation. Moreover, depending upon the subject matter of
the investigation, a party may be put at a serious disadvantage if he
is forced to litigate his claim without the aid of evidence obtained by
a nonparty investigatory body. In a situation such as Cirale,for example,
the investigation of a public agency with superior skills and manpower
is likely to be more thorough than that of an ordinary litigant. The
stringent requirements in New York for disclosure against a nonparty
will most likely be given, therefore, serious consideration by the practitoner choosing a forum for his action.
ARTICLE

34-

CALENDAR PRACT1ICE; TRiAL PREFERENCES

CPLR 3404: Fourth Departmentvacates a dismissal for abandonment
upon condition that neglectful attorney pay $1000 in costs.
CPLR 3404 provides for the dismissal of cases which have been
struck from the calendar and not restored within one year. 140 The
purpose and principal advantage of rule 3404 is that it prevents cases
actually abandoned from "haunting litigants" years later.141 Unlike
1'3 Professor Siegel has expressed the fear that trial judges who have "accumulated
their experience under the much more restrictive approach (to disclosure) of the old Civil
Practice Act" would not implement "the Court of Appeals' aim in Allen ....
.. 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 8101, commentary at 27 (1970). Ironically, a number of trial judges
did apply the Allen reasoning to CPLR 8101(a)(4), see note 123 supra, while the Court of
Appeals in Cirale did not. See text accompanying notes 132-34 supra.
140 CPLR 3404 states:
A case in the supreme court or a county court marked "off" or struck from the
calendar or unanswered on a clerk's calendar call, and not restored within one
year thereafter, shall be deemed abandoned and shall be dismissed without
costs for neglect to prosecute. The clerk shall make an appropriate entry without
the necessity of an order.
The Court of Appeals, in vacating the dismissal of an action which was litigated for 25
years, construed the phrase "deemed abandoned" as suggesting "a presumption rather
than a fixed and immutable policy of dismissal... [which] was never intended to apply
to a case where litigation in a cause was actually in progress." Marco v. Sachs, 10 N.Y.2d
542, 550, 181 N.E.2d 892, 895, 226 N.Y.S.2d 853, 358 (1962) (emphasis added). In Tactuk v.
Freiberg, 24 App. Div. 2d 503, 261 N.Y.S.2d 438 (2d Dep't 1965), the Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that a CPLR 3404 dismissal was unjustified where a motion was
pending at the time of the dismissal and the parties were actively negotiating matters
related to the action, noting there had been no abandonment in fact.
CPLR 8404 is limited to the supreme court and the county courts. Other courts, however, such as the Court of Claims, the district courts, and the New York City Civil Court,
have similar rules. See 4 WK&-M
8404.10 n.19.
1414 WKM
3404.01.

